The following is Connor Boyack’s response to Brandon Dabling’s review of Boyack’s book Latter-day Liberty: A Gospel Approach to Government and Politics. Boyack’s response is followed by Dabling’s response to Boyack’s comments.

 

 

By Connor Boyack

 

I write in response to a recent review of my book, Latter-day Liberty: A Gospel Approach to Government and Politics, written by Brandon Dabling of the JAC Editorial Board. I appreciate the opportunity to publish my comments here to further the discussion and point out several misrepresentations in that review.

 

Mr. Dabling alerted me to his published review in an email, noting that he had done his best to be fair. Reading his lengthy comments on the first half of the book, however, I must conclude that he missed the mark. Perhaps the easiest way to explain such a conclusion is to observe the pervasive theme of the first half of the book, and note its complete absence in Dabling’s review.

 

Throughout most of the chapters in the first half, and supplemented with scripture and quotes from church leaders, philosophers, and historical figures, I advance an argument as to government’s legitimacy. That argument was perhaps best defined by Ezra Taft Benson, who I quote in the book as follows: “the proper function of government is limited only to those spheres of activity within which the individual citizen has the right to act.”

 

Government is merely an institution of individuals who collectively delegate to that body certain powers it wishes. It cannot legitimately exercise any authority that is not innately held by the individuals who comprise it. In all questions of government power over the lives of individuals, this basic question must be asked: “whence does the government derive this authority?” And yet this basic question, addressed and discussed repeatedly throughout the first half of the book, is notably left out of what is claimed to be a fair review. I find that interesting.

 

It seems, rather, that Dabling chose to focus on specific things with which he disagreed, rather than attempt a “fair” review of the content itself. As such, my response will of necessity follow the same pattern, responding to and refuting some of the criticisms offered.

 

First, I should note that Dabling employs a term for which I offer a whole chapter of context: libertarian. He correctly notes that I advocate that the LDS faith aligns itself well with “libertarianism” and that that political philosophy is the only one which finds any consistency and principle in defending liberty. Yet nowhere does he reference the context and definition of that term which I offer. In the book, I explain that while many people have a preconceived notion of what a “libertarian” is and advocates, my use of the term throughout the book is narrowed and very specific. I use the term only to describe someone who supports the political philosophy of liberty. Understanding what “liberty” is (and thus what a “libertarian” advocates) requires dozens of pages of explanation in the book. Quite simply it is embodied in this quote by David O. McKay: “A man may act as his conscience dictates so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of others. That is the spirit of true democracy, and all government by the Priesthood should be actuated by that same high motive.”

 

Dabling claims at the outset that I find Republicans and Democrats to both be substandard advocates of liberty, but then in the following paragraph he opines that “Conservatives and libertarians both cherish individual liberty and are dedicated to its protection.” This is a misguided assumption I repeatedly refute in the book. For example, on page 112:

 

As conventional wisdom goes, modern-day liberals favor big government, regulation of business, redistribution of wealth, and a fundamental responsibility to help those in need. Modern-day conservatives favor limited government, free enterprise, private property, and a system of privatized, voluntary charity. Though these distinctions may superficially suggest a substantial difference between the two, they are in fact like step-children, sharing a common parent. In this case, that parent is interventionism—the utilization of government to force another person or group of people to act in a way that they want. Conservatives laud the so-called “war on terror” while liberals encourage the “war on poverty”; one group supports business licensure and the other agrees and tops it with further regulation. One supports government intervention in the bedroom, and the other wants it in the boardroom. Both may apply their advocacy of anti-liberty interventionism in different ways, but their roots betray their outward appearance; today’s conservatives and liberals in fact share much in common. It might be argued that the two-party system in America consists simply of two factions within the same interventionist party. Both Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals support tariffs and taxes, regulation and licensing, foreign intervention, social restriction, and a slew of other policies and programs that show no regard for individual liberty.

 

Whether someone espouses a supposedly conservative, (modern) liberal, progressive, moderate, or centrist ideology (each of which can be consolidated into an anti-liberty, interventionist philosophy), the result is the same: principle gives way to power, and liberty to centralized micromanagement of our lives.

 

Dabling continues by alleging that I have my theology wrong on the War in Heaven. In doing so, he completely misrepresents my view and puts words into my book that are nowhere to be found. “Boyack paints the caricature that Satan’s plan was essentially to turn the hosts of heaven into mindless drones,” he writes, “who were forced to do what was right so that they might be saved.”

 

This is completely false. Nowhere do I claim that Satan wanted to compel righteousness or use coercion to enforce obedience. The entire next paragraph is dedicated to a correction of my supposed errant views; I agree entirely with Dabling’s unnecessary rebuttal. It is one I myself advance in the book in arguing, as he does, that Satan “sought to destroy agency by refusing to respect the natural tie linking choices and consequences.” I say it this way on page 18:

 

Despite the unworkable conditions proposed by Lucifer, he successfully gained a significant following by luring away many of his fellow spirit siblings with promises of guaranteed salvation regardless of what they would choose to do on earth. (Ironically, those who joined forces with Satan to destroy agency exercised their own agency in doing so.) Not one soul would be lost, the devil claimed, thus implying that he would nullify God’s commandments and remove any need for obedience to divine authority. In effect, he was proposing that everybody would be able to “eat, drink and be merry” (2 Nephi 28:7-8), then at the judgment bar receive an unconditional stamp of approval.

 

Or on page 23:

 

While we are free to choose, we are not free from the consequences of those choices. As Elder Marvin J. Ashton once taught: “Our freedom to choose our course of conduct does not provide personal freedom from the consequences of our performances. God’s love for us is constant and will not diminish, but he cannot rescue us from the painful results that are caused by wrong choices.” The eternal law of the harvest—”whatsoever ye sow, that shall ye also reap” (D&C 6:33)—remains in effect, and reminds us that our choices will be followed by their corresponding consequences. “And [men] are free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great Mediator of all men,” taught Lehi, “or to choose captivity and death, according to the captivity and power of the devil” (2 Nephi 2:27).

 

Or on page 28:

 

So successful were Gadianton and his band of followers, that by encouraging wickedness and offering others the opportunity to avoid any consequences and ignore all laws regarding their evil actions, they were able to achieve “peacefully” what they could not achieve by simply murdering the leaders of the government previous to that time.

 

This correct view on the War in Heaven is explained in great detail in the book Satan’s War on Free Agency by Greg Wright. I incorporate the material in my own book, include Wright’s book in my suggested reading list in the appendix, and received an endorsement from Wright. Had I actually claimed the “force” argument as Dabling somehow thinks I do, none of that would have happened. So begins a trend throughout the remainder of the review in claiming things that have no basis in fact.

 

Dabling’s thesis at the outset—that I have misinterpreted the War in Heaven and issue of agency—is further weakened when he claims that “a much different reading of the political principles at stake” in that war is obtained by understanding that “Satan’s ‘plan’ was never a plan in the sense that it would have been enacted had the votes lined up differently.” Again, I agree with this point (though he somehow seems to think I don’t) and wrote thusly on page 18:

 

Satan’s proposal to allegedly ensure the salvation of every single one of God’s children was a non-starter from the beginning—a plan that was never anything more than a fictional and cunning attempt to usurp God’s power. It was an illegitimate attempt to distort God’s plan, and one which would have destroyed man’s agency.

 

The review continues with several contentions that the definition of liberty I offer is “void of any moral meaning.” I do not “use the word the way the American Founders did,” according to Dabling. To those men, he writes, liberty was “the balancing of rights and responsibilities.”

 

Of course, nowhere do I claim that responsibilities should not be fulfilled, nor morality promoted. As a self-reliant and faithful Mormon, I of course believe quite the opposite. But Dabling still fails to understand the point of my book, as it relates to the theme he excluded from his “fair” review. My intent is to question the legitimacy of government power, and understand under what circumstances it has any moral basis. This specific discussion requires no mention of responsibilities, for just because an individual is irresponsible or immoral, it does not therefore follow that the government may be empowered to be his caretaker. Incidentally, the subject of personal responsibility as it relates to individual liberty is the subject of my second book. If Dabling is critical of my exclusion of that topic from this book, he’ll just have to be patient!

 

More misguided criticism is directed towards my discussion of the proper and moral use of force in the book. Dabling writes: “It is absurd, therefore, to judge the merits of governments or their laws by whether they are backed by force. The better measuring stick is whether it protects man’s liberties, is based on the consent of the governed, and contributes to the public good.” I completely disagree. Again, as I exhaustively note in the book, the only proper measuring stick for government is whether its asserted power has any moral legitimacy—if the individuals who supposedly delegated that power themselves possess it. Judging a law by its effectiveness, popular support, or intended consequences may feel good to those who agree with the policy, but that near-sighted approval of authority fails to address whether the authority is itself legitimate at all.

 

Dabling attempts to dismiss my review of nullification (though noting that I do my readers “a service in bringing to light excerpts from early Church leaders”) by saying that it “risks violating the 12th article of faith.” I once again disagree; I spend several pages explaining how many people misunderstand this article of faith and read into it, as Dabling has, something that does not exist. In short, obedience is only an obligation to political leaders as they themselves obey, honor, and sustain the law. To the extent that they violate that trust and mandate things for which they have no authority, then, as Joseph F. Smith said: “…where is the law human or divine, which binds me, as an individual, to outwardly and openly proclaim my acceptance of their acts?”

 

Predictably, Dabling further attempts to discredit the political doctrine of nullification by suggesting that “one would have to accept that blacks in the 1960s had no basis for equal protection under the Constitution, or natural law.” But almost all proponents of nullification argue no such thing, but rather its opposite. Contrary to erroneous high school history textbooks, it was northern states who used nullification more often than the southern states, especially to oppose the fugitive slave laws. And while it was poorly used in some cases half a century ago, one need not cast it aside entirely because in some cases its application is unfortunate. To myopically conclude that nullifcation’s result has only been negative, as Dabling implies, is extremely myopic. Dr. Tom Woods’ book Nullification buries that assertion with overwhelming evidence of its praiseworthy use.

 

This business of nullifying laws, whether as a state or individual, is certainly no trivial issue. Dabling expresses concern that I am guiding the reader down troubled paths: “I fear,” he writes, “that Boyack oversimplifies the complexity of judgment of whether Saints should be in the business of violating the laws of the land.” And yet I write on page 91: “Obviously, those who refuse to comply with unconstitutional or unjust governmental decrees will find themselves—like anybody exercising their agency—having to deal with the consequences of that choice. The gravity of such disobedience led Jefferson to note in the Declaration of Independence that ‘light and transient causes’ should not fuel revolutionary tendencies.” I also explain elsewhere in the book that this is a weighty matter and thus imply the very “complexity of judgement” Dabling somehow feels I simplify too much.

 

That charge of oversimplification is one which might instead be turned towards Dabling’s review. For example, he quotes James E. Faust (as I do, in the book) to argue that we should not disobey unconstitutional laws, but seek their repeal or modification through established means. Yet he fails to list the numerous scriptures and other quotes from church leaders I include which suggest, if not explicitly state, the opposite. In fact, five whole pages are dedicated to offering such examples. Oversimplification indeed. One would hope that a truly “fair” review would reference all sides of the issues being discussed, rather than touching on one while totally excluding the other.

 

As this response is already twice the length of what I had intended it to be, I’ll refrain from addressing other issues I have with Dabling’s review and conclude by reaffirming my appreciation for the commentary, though I clearly object with the misrepresentations made.

 

Liberty is indeed worth fighting for. While I believe that Dabling’s review does not correctly nor “fairly” describe my understanding and explanation of the term, I hope that at a minimum it will generate further interest in the subject and lead people to read for themselves what I have to say, and more importantly, what the scriptures and leaders of the church have to say.

 

Connor Boyack is director of the Utah Tenth Amendment Center and author of Latter-day Liberty: A Gospel Approach to Government and Politics.

 

Dabling’s Response to Boyack:

I’d like to thank Connor Boyack for taking the time to respond to my review. It’s certainly not an easy thing to write a book and then defend it to the world as others criticize and try to poke holes in its arguments. As I mentioned at the beginning of my article, I never intended to give a full review or critique of his book, but to address three areas I viewed as major problems. Had I charted out every point Boyack made, there certainly would have been many things I would have praised.

 

The risk in this response now is to launch a game of “You said I said this when I really didn’t” and “Well, you actually did say that.” I’m not interested in that, and for that reason I will not address every one of Boyack’s grievances. I do, however, think that some response is merited.

 

I do stand by my criticisms of Boyack’s book with the exception of the fact that I did overlook a passage that indicates he at least partially agrees with me on the war in heaven. I apologize for this. I do think, however, there are good reasons I came away with the reading I did.

 

Boyack begins his chapter on the war in heaven by quoting President Charles W. Nibley, saying that Satan’s plan was “government and salvation for all, to be secured by the spirit of force and compulsion, wherein all would be saved without agency, or what we call common consent.” (Boyack, 16) We can’t assume that authors agree with every quote they put in their work, but I’m puzzled about why Boyack led with this quote and then didn’t explicitly address and correct its ideas if his understanding of the war in heaven is that it was solely about the tie between choices and consequences and not coercion. Rather, the quote falls in line with other quotes advancing his argument. In describing “Lucifer’s attempt to destroy our agency,” Boyack says “[Satan] would have eliminated our stewardship and need for accountability, for as President David O. McKay taught: ‘If [Lucifer’s] plan had been accepted, human beings would have become mere puppets in the hands of a dictator,’” (22). Later, he again employs the language that Satan wanted to “impose a dictatorship and subject us to his will…” (29). The language of “dictator” and “dictatorship” speaks to the use of force and coercion — a person who speaks (dictates) and then enforces these edicts. The use of force is the dominant theme of Boyack’s war in heaven chapter, and this is why I connected this theme to the quotes and passage I’ve cited here. As Boyack does agree with me on this question about what Satan proposed during the war in heaven, it would seem to have been proper for him to expound upon the true issue at hand during that war instead of burying it in a chapter dedicated to the use of force as it relates to the destruction of agency and the war in heaven. But, if he agrees with me on this question, I see no reason to further belabor the point except to once again raise the question of what possible implications this reading (opposed to the force and coercion reading) might have on how LDS view and defend agency in politics.

 

Boyack still says that my review somehow missed the core of his book. He complains that the review doesn’t give the reference or context for his definition of libertarianism, and he then supplies a quote in which President David O. McKay defines liberty. The definition is the same as the one from my review, only I employ Boyack’s own words. Boyack, however, insists on President McKay’s formulation, seemingly because he said it.

 

Boyack takes issue with my critique that his liberty is “void of any moral meaning,” and then obfuscates the argument by insisting that he doesn’t argue against responsibility and indeed practices it in his own life. Virtue in the private sphere was never the primary issue at hand in my review. I begin my argument talking about the need for virtue in citizens’ private lives and then connect it to the need for virtue in politics because “unrestrained or unguided freedom cannot preserve liberty.” I then argue “We must remember, however, that it is the basic problem of government to maintain rule of law (order) without devolving into tyranny and maintain the maximum amount of freedom without crossing into license, which creates its own — perhaps more subtle — form of tyranny.”

 

My argument was that we as citizens must more carefully consider the implications virtue has on how we govern. I am sure many libertarians are virtuous and responsible people in their private lives. I’ve met many of them, and I’ve never said otherwise. My critique of libertarianism is that it acts “as if it did not have to bear the consequences of [license].” It argues for the legalization of license without considering how to then address the toll this will have on society. It refuses to play even a subsidiary role to create conditions of true liberty and happiness. It simply says that government shouldn’t coerce through law, but it doesn’t seriously think about what society would look like after barriers to such activities are removed. With regards to the public sphere, Boyack does disregard “the balancing of rights and responsibilities” and the promotion of morality, or virtue because this falls outside his proper role of government. The connection between virtue and politics was always the issue at hand, but Boyack, unfortunately, refuses to engage on this most central issue.

 

On the issue of nullification, Boyack insists I’ve misunderstood the 12th Article of Faith and failed to grasp the point behind “the several pages [of Latter-day Liberty] explaining how many people misunderstand this article and read into it, as Dabling has, something that does not exist.” If I’m wrong about the 12th Article of Faith, it’s not because I’ve read into it. If anything, my flaw would be that I don’t see the exceptions to the plain text. Even more, Boyack fails to engage my argument, but simply throws out another quote. We could get into a game of “I raise your Joseph F. Smith with this here James E. Faust,” but that doesn’t interest me, and I don’t think it helps us think about underlying principles. If Boyack wants to engage the argument instead of claiming the authority of something an apostle or church president once said — which doesn’t agree with what later ones have said —I’d be happy to join him. If he wants to respond to my criticism and discuss how his principle of nullification is substantively different from civil disobedience, I’d happily oblige.

 

I stand by my statement about the danger of teaching nullification as Boyack has. Teaching we have the duty to violate unconstitutional laws or those that violate natural law is irresponsible. Though Boyack points out that people not abiding by the positive law must bear the consequences, this by no means gets him off the hook. If someone tells people they have the moral responsibility to run in front of oncoming traffic but nevertheless informs them of the likely danger, does this obviate the moral responsibility of giving this teaching? Granted, this isn’t a perfect example, but it’s absurd to think that because Boyack warns people of the likely disastrous consequences of following his counsel that it is then prudent and morally responsible to give it.

 

To close, let me touch upon what I wish we could have talked about in this exchange. In my review I give a substantial critique about the blind spots of libertarianism and whether Boyack’s definition of liberty (which is then championed by libertarianism) is true liberty. I give my reasons for why such a definition of liberty is short-sighted and incapable of preserving liberty in the long-run. I talk about the connection between virtue and happiness and how government cannot remain neutral on these questions. I talk about the potential reasons why using nullification is imprudent and would bring serious consequences — consequences I believe various Church leaders had in sight when making various decisions about how to react in the public sphere. In short, I’ve given many reasons to support my arguments with what I see as the most serious issues at stake with Boyack’s book, and he hasn’t engaged me. Instead, he’s chosen to point out places where I’ve supposedly misquoted or misrepresented him, insist I have not understood his argument, and then continue to throw out quotes from Church leadership as if that settled the issue. Understandably, Boyack thought he needed to show where I misrepresent his work, but I would have greatly preferred that he seriously engage me on the issues.

 

 

 

 

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